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For later stages of spoken language processing, we tend to store the meaning of messages 
and not the exact wording and grammatical structure. For earlier levels of linguistic processing, 
research has found evidence of talker-specificity effects. However, these talker-specificity effects 
are more robustly observed when attention is directed to talker identity compared to syntactic 
information. The current study examines whether talker provides a context that guides the 
integration of semantic information in memory for spoken language. The paradigm used, 
developed by Bransford and Franks (1971), involves a sentence recognition task. Across four 
experiments, 100 participants listened to sentences during an encoding phase that were derived 
from complete semantic ideas and were then subsequently tested for memory of new but 
semantically-related sentences. Talker variability (same talker vs. different talkers) and attention 
(talker vs. semantic information) during the encoding phase were manipulated. All experiments 
provided evidence of semantic integration for spoken language in that listeners showed more 
false memories at recognition for sentences that matched the complete semantic ideas presented 
during encoding compared to partial matches. False memories at recognition for sentences 
matching complete semantic ideas decreased when listeners were attending to semantic 
information and heard 24 different talkers during encoding, and also when attending to talker 
information. We observed evidence that talker can provide a limited context for the semantic 
integration of spoken language, and memory for spoken language relies more heavily on 
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Anyone who has been called out on telling a story wrong can understand that our 
memories are not as reliable as we would want them to be. Reconstructive memory refers to the 
process of recollection where we fill in missing components of our memory to make sense of 
events. These fill-ins are not without error (Bartlett, 1995). Previous research on false memory 
recall has examined how we appear to integrate ideas into coherent wholes based on meaningful 
relationships among pieces of information (e.g., De Villiers, 1974; Luftig, 1982). These studies 
have manipulated cohesiveness, or interrelatedness, of sentences to suggest that integrating 
information into more meaningful representations (cohesive stories) causes memory for the 
original sentence structure and specific sentence words to be lost (Anderson & Bower, 1973; 
Pompi & Lachman, 1967). 
Research by Bransford and Franks (1971) suggests that listeners spontaneously integrate 
semantically-related sentences into complete semantic representations and will recognize many 
sentences never presented during encoding if they are consistent with acquired semantic 
representations. In their study, listeners completed an encoding phase and a recognition phase. 
During encoding, listeners heard sentences produced by a single speaker that contained 
components of a complex semantic idea. For example, listeners would hear sentences such as (1) 
“The ants were in the kitchen,” (2) “The sweet jelly was on the table,” and (3) “The ants ate the 
jelly.” These three sentences are all related to a complete semantic idea. Following the encoding 
phase, where listeners heard the individual components, listeners were presented with a sentence 
that contained the complete semantic idea, such as “The ants in the kitchen ate the sweet jelly 
which was on the table,” and were asked whether or not they had heard that sentence during the 
encoding phase. The results showed that listeners reported hearing sentences that matched the 
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complete semantic idea, even though these sentences were never presented during encoding. 
False memories were also observed for sentences that showed a partial match to the full semantic 
idea, such as “The jelly was on the table,” but the greater number of false memories was 
observed for sentences that matched the complete semantic idea. The false memories cannot be 
explained simply by length of the sentence, because false memories were very low for 
equivalently long sentences that contained semantic violations of information during encoding, 
such as “The old man on the couch ate the sweet jelly in the hut at the edge of the woods.”  
Bransford and Franks (1971) concluded that when we hear spoken language we spontaneously 
integrate the meaning across the utterances we hear, and it is this semantic information that is 
preserved in memory instead of the specific individual sentences. These initial studies suggest 
that when it comes to remembering language over time, meaning is more important than the 
exact form. Yet, more detailed analyses of semantic integration are needed. This is especially 
important given the fact that listeners encode speech under variable conditions and from many 
different talkers. 
Even though there is great variability in speech signals both within and across speakers, 
listeners are usually able to recognize words and their meanings, even when they have never 
heard a specific speaker before (e.g., Blandon, Henton, & Pickering, 1984; Disner, 1980; 
Nygaard, Sommers, & Pisoni, 1994). Indeed, listeners achieve stable linguistic representations 
despite considerable variability in speech signals (e.g., Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, & 
Studdert-Kennedy, 1967; Shankweiler, Strange, & Verbrugge, 1977). A major goal in speech 
perception research has been to describe how listeners extract meaning from talkers even with 
variability in the acoustic signals of speech. Two competing theories have attempted to explain 
how listeners create stable representations despite talker variability: abstractionist and episodic 
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(exemplar) approaches. According to the abstractionist approach, speech is organized by 
listeners based on abstract properties as oppose to being organized by specific speaker 
information, such as speaking rate, voice, accent, and gender (e.g., Fitzpatrick & Wheeldon, 
2000; Lahiri & Reetz, 2002; Nguyen, Wauquier, & Tuller, 2009; Norris, & McQueen, 2008; 
Stevens, 2002). While research has supported the abstractionist approach, this view is being 
challenged by research that has pointed towards episodic (exemplar) theories which stem in part 
by our ability to retain surface details of spoken words (e.g., Goldinger, 1998; Palmeri et al., 
1993; Van Berkum et al., 2008). Exemplar theories emphasize that every experience of a spoken 
word is stored in memory, and word recognition is due to activation of memories that most 
closely resemble the utterance (Goldinger, 1998). Supporting this theory are studies showing that 
some phonetic detail, including talker-specific information, is stored in memory (e.g., Goldinger, 
1998; Theodore, Blumstein, & Luthra, 2015).  
Some researchers have taken these two perspectives and combined them into 
complementary models that favor the interaction between encoding fine phonetic detail and 
abstract phonological representations in speech perception (e.g., Goldinger, 2007; Hawkins, 
2003; Luce & McLennan, 2005; McLennan & Luce, 2005; Pierrehumbert, 2006). Essentially, 
this theoretical middle ground suggests that internal representations in memory are initially 
episodic, and with more exposure and examples they combine into more abstract units 
(Goldinger, 2007). Despite this emerging trend toward hybrid models for explaining these 
behavioral phenomena, research on speech recognition theories has still primarily examined 
memory at the word level as oppose to the sentence level (e.g., Goldinger, 1998; Norris, & 
McQueen, 2008; Van Berkum et al., 2008).  
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Further research from spoken word recognition literature suggests that spoken language 
processing is actually more effective when talker information remains the same from one event 
to the next (e.g., Goldinger, 1998; Nygaard & Pisoni, 1998; Palmeri et al., 1993; Pilotti et al., 
2000). For instance, listeners understand familiar talkers better than unfamiliar talkers when 
transcribing speech presented in noise (Nygaard et al., 1994). Additionally, same voice word 
repetitions are recognized more quickly and accurately than different voice repetitions, even 
without explicit instructions to pay attention to the talker’s voice (Palmeri et al., 1993). Thus, 
during the early stages of speech processing, redundant surface information is automatically 
encoded and retained in memory. Geiselman and Bellezza (1977) found that participants did not 
successfully remember the gender of the speaker of sentences that contained male or female 
agents; however, retention of gender did occur when sentences contained agents that lacked 
masculine or feminine connotation (e.g., “the puppy” or “the youngster”). Therefore, retention of 
voice is not independent of the semantic content in sentences.  
In addition to semantic content, other research has suggested that talker-specificity effects 
are also influenced by attention to talker identity (e.g., McLennan & Luce, 2005; Palmeri et al., 
1993; Theodore et al., 2015). Listeners show a processing advantage for word recognition when 
words are presented in the same voice as compared to when voices are different most strongly 
when attention is directed to talker rather than syntactic information (Theodore et al., 2015). 
Similarly, research has found improved speech perception in noise when attending to a familiar 
talker’s voice than when attending to an unfamiliar voice (Nygaard & Pisoni, 1998). Thus, 
research suggests that, in addition to semantic content influences, explicit attention to talker 




Furthermore, false recognition of lexical words that are semantically associated with 
previously studied words increases when words are spoken by the same talker, but only when 
listeners are directed to attend to talker information (Luthra et al., 2018). Therefore, talker 
information may influence higher level semantic processing by connecting representations of 
other words in the lexical-semantic network. At the word level, talker-specific information is 
being encoded, and this process is enhanced by attention to talker (Goldinger, 1998; Luthra et al., 
2018; Theodore et al., 2015). This research suggests that for smaller linguistic units, talker 
provides context for memory and semantic integration in certain conditions. However, does 
talker pervade semantic integration beyond the word level? Research suggests that individuals 
spontaneously integrate semantically-related sentences (Bransford & Franks, 1971), yet talker 
information may influence semantic integration, especially at the short sentence level and when 
attention is explicitly directed to talker. If talker-specific information is providing context for 
semantic integration at the word level and this process is strengthened by attention, then the role 
of talker is predicted to influence short sentences as well.  
In summary, the current research indicates that for shorter linguistic units (i.e., words), 
talker information is important during early stages of spoken language processing (Theodore et 
al., 2015) and may provide structure for integration of spoken language processing (Luthra et al., 
2018). However, for longer linguistic units (i.e., sentences), semantic integration is important 
(Bransford & Franks, 1971). When it comes to remembering language over time, memory for 
form of language is poor, but our memory for meaning of language is detailed (Sachs, 1974). 
Further research is needed to understand whether integration of semantic processing at the 
sentence level is linked to talker in order to inform theory and also to further our understanding 
of how we integrate spoken language in memory. Knowledge regarding the role of talker and 
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meaning in memory processes has implications for an understanding of the interaction between 
language and cognitive processes.  
The current study used the semantic integration paradigm of Bransford and Franks (1971) 
to examine the role of attention and talker-specificity effects on the retrieval of sentences. In this 
experimental study, participants heard related sentences during an encoding phase and were 
directed to attend to either semantic or talker information during encoding. In addition to 
attention during encoding, we also manipulated whether listeners heard one or more than one 
speaker during encoding. During a subsequent recognition phase, participants heard all new 
sentences produced by either the same or a different talker than was heard during encoding. 
Some of the sentences were semantically related to those presented during encoding and others 
were not. During the recognition stage, participants stated whether or not they recognized the 
sentences from encoding and how confident they were in their decisions. The specific research 
questions under evaluation are as follows: 
1. Does talker provide a context for the integration of semantic processing such that 
listening to the same talker during encoding increases false memories of sentences 
compared to when listeners hear more than one talker during encoding? 
2. Does attention to talker information during encoding influence semantic integration? 
We examined these questions across four recognition memory experiments, each consisting of an 
encoding and recognition phase, following the paradigm of Bransford and Franks (1971). Stimuli 
presented at recognition were always produced by the same single female speaker. Across the 
experiments, we manipulated the number of speakers and attention during encoding. In 
experiment 1, attention was directed to semantic information and the encoding sentences were 
spoken by either the same speaker as recognition or by a different single male speaker. In 
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experiment 2, the encoding stimuli were produced by the same single female speaker as heard 
during recognition; however, attention during encoding was directed towards talker information. 
In experiment 3, encoding sentences were spoken by two speakers, one of whom was the same as 
presented during recognition, with attention directed towards semantic information. In 
experiment 4, attention during encoding was also directed towards semantic information, but 
each encoding sentence was produced by a different speaker, all of whom were different than the 
recognition speaker. Table 1 shows a summary of the experimental conditions across 
experiments. 
Table 1. Overview of the four experiments in terms of the condition identifier and 
corresponding talker(s) and attention during encoding. The talker at recognition was identical 
for all conditions across all experiments. 
Experiment Condition 
Encoding  Recognition 
Talker(s) Attention  Talker 
1 F1.Semantic F1 Lexical  F1 
 M1.Semantic M1 Lexical  F1 
2 F1.Semantic F1 Lexical  F1 
 F1.Talker F1 Talker  F1 
3 F1.Semantic F1 Lexical  F1 
 F1-M1.Semantic F1, M1 Lexical  F1 
4 F1.Semantic F1 Lexical  F1 
 Fx-Mx.Semantic F2 – F13, M2 – M13 Lexical  F1 
 
For the first research question, we hypothesized that talker information would guide the 
integration of semantic units such that listening to the same talker would increase false memories 
compared to listening to multiple talkers. Given that we spontaneously integrate related 
information (Bransford & Franks, 1971) and retain talker information (Palmeri et al., 1993), 
sentences spoken by different talkers should be stored as separate episodic memories. For the 
second question, the findings of Luthra et al. (2018) would suggest that more false memories 
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would be observed when listeners explicitly attend to talker compared to semantic information 
during encoding. An alternative hypothesis is that attention to talker identity would promote 
greater encoding of surface detail, and thus decrease the proportion of false memories compared 
to when listeners attend to semantic information proper.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
 The goal of experiment 1 was two-fold. First, we aimed to replicate Bransford and Franks 
(1971), who demonstrated that memory for spoken language reflects the integration of semantic 
information across spoken sentences. As in the original study, a single speaker produced all 
sentences during the encoding phase, and attention during encoding was directed towards 
semantic information. Second, we examined whether the degree of semantic integration observed 
during the recognition phase would be diminished if the speaker changed between the encoding 
and recognition phases. To achieve these goals, two listener groups completed encoding and 
recognition phases. All recognition sentences were produced by the same female speaker (F1). 
For one group (F1.Semantic), the encoding sentences were produced by the same speaker as 
heard during recognition (F1), but for the other group (M1.Semantic), the encoding sentences 
were produced a different (male) speaker (M1). For both groups, false memories were measured 
during the recognition phase in order to examine semantic integration. 
Methods 
Participants. Forty adults were recruited from the University of Connecticut community 
to serve as listeners in the experiment. Participants were native monolingual speakers of English 
between 18 and 22 years of age (mean = 19, SD = 1; men = 8, women = 32) with no history of 
speech, language, or hearing impairment according to self-report. All listeners passed a pure-tone 
hearing screen bilaterally at 20 dB HL for 500 Hz, 1000 Hz, 2000 Hz, and 4000 Hz. Listeners 
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received course credit or monetary compensation for their participation in the experiment. An 
additional two listeners were tested but excluded from analyses due to poor performance on the 
NONCASE sentences, as described below. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
groups: F1.Semantic (n = 20) or M1.Semantic (n = 20). Participants in the F1.Semantic group 
heard a single female speaker (F1) during encoding. Participants in the M1.Semantic group heard 
a single male speaker during encoding (M1). Both groups heard the same single female speaker 
(F1) during the recognition phase. Attention for both listener groups was directed to semantic 
information during the encoding phase. 
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of 54 English sentences, some of which were used during 
the initial encoding phase of the study (24 sentences), and some of which were used during the 
subsequent recognition phase (30 sentences). All sentences were derived from four complex 
sentences (i.e., FOURs) that that consist of complete “ideas,” which were taken from the 
Bransford and Franks stimulus set (1971). An example of these complex sentences, referred to as 
a “FOUR,” is “The scared cat running from the barking dog jumped on the table.” Each complex 
sentence was used to create additional sentences that contained three, two, or one element(s) of 
the full complex sentences, referred to as THREEs, TWOs, and ONEs, respectively. An example 
of a THREE for the complex sentence above is, “The scared cat was running from the barking 
dog.” An example of a TWO for the same complex sentence is, “The scared cat jumped on the 
table.” Finally, an example of a ONE is “The cat jumped on the table.” A complex sentence plus 
the derived sentences constituted one idea set. The current stimulus set consisted of four idea sets 
from Bransford and Franks (1971), labeled idea sets E, F, G, and H. Each idea set contained 12 
sentences (i.e., one FOUR, three THREEs, four TWOs, and four ONEs). Table 2 shows the 
sentences for idea set E; the full list of sentences is shown in Appendix A. 
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Table 2. Stimulus sentences for idea set E. All sentences are derived from the complex 
semantic idea, referred to as sentence type FOUR. Each idea set consisted of 12 sentences, six 
that were presented during acquisition and six that were presented during recognition. The 
full list of sentences is provided in Appendix A. 
Idea set Type Sentence Phase 
E FOUR 
The scared cat running from the barking dog 
jumped on the table. 
Recognition 
E THREE 
The cat running from the barking dog jumped 
on the table. 
Encoding 
E THREE 




The scared cat running from the dog jumped on 
the table. 
Recognition 
E TWO The scared cat jumped on the table. Encoding 
E TWO 
The cat running from the dog jumped on the 
table. 
Encoding 
E TWO The scared cat was running from the dog. Recognition 
E TWO The cat was running from the barking dog. Recognition 
E ONE The cat jumped on the table. Encoding 
E ONE The dog was barking. Encoding 
E ONE The cat was scared. Recognition 
E ONE The cat was running from the dog. Recognition 
 
In addition to the idea set sentences, six NONCASE sentences were created. These 
sentences contained information present in the four idea sets, but their composition violated the 
semantic relationships in the ideas to be learned. In other words, each NONCASE had the same 
number of elements as the FOURs, however, they were composed of information from multiple 
idea sets. For example, one of the NONCASE sentences was “The barking dog jumped on the 
old car in the front yard,” which contains elements from three idea sets. The inclusion of 
NONCASE sentences provides a critical control condition for two reasons. First, the NONCASE 
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sentences are matched in length to the FOURs and thus can serve as a control that performance 
for the FOURs is solely due to sentence length (instead of semantic integration). Second, the 
NONCASE sentences can be used to gauge whether participants are attending to the 
experimental task, given that false memories for NONCASE sentences is expected to be 
extremely rare (Bransford & Franks, 1971). In the current study, high accuracy (≥ 80%) for the 
NONCASE sentences was required in order to be included in further analyses; individuals who 
did not meet this criterion were removed and replaced with a new participant. The full list of 54 
sentence used in the current study are shown in Appendix A.  As shown in Table 2 and in 
Appendix A, some sentences were only presented during encoding and others were presented 
only during recognition. Of note, the FOURs and NONCASEs were only presented during the 
recognition phase. 
To acquire auditory versions of these stimuli, one male talker (M1) and one female talker 
(F1) were recorded producing four repetitions of the 54 sentences in a randomized order. Both 
talkers were monolingual native speakers of American English. Recordings were made in a 
sound-attenuated booth. Speech was recorded via an Audio-Technica AT803 omnidirectional 
condenser microphone positioned approximately two inches from the speakers’ lips; the 
microphone was connected to a preamplifier and recordings were stored directly to hard drive. 
The Praat speech analysis software was used to excise each target sentence into an isolated file 
and to measure sentence duration.   
Of the four repetitions of each target sentence, one was selected by the first author for 
further use that was of high acoustic quality (i.e., perceptually clear of acoustic and articulatory 
artifacts). Furthermore, in order to ensure that talkers did not differ in speaking rate, target 
sentences were selected to minimize differences in sentence duration across the two speakers. 
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After selecting the final 108 sentences (54 sentences x 2 speakers), the female talker showed 
slightly shorter sentence durations compared to the male talker. To further equate mean sentence 
duration between the two talkers, the duration manipulation from GSU Praat Tools was used to 
scale duration of the male talker’s sentences using a scaling factor of 0.90. Sentence duration of 
the selected acquisition sentences was submitted to ANOVA with the factors of talker (F1 vs. 
M1) and item type (THREEs vs. TWOs vs. ONEs). Item was treated as subject in this analysis 
and thus talker was a within-subjects factor (as each sentence was produced by each talker) and 
item type was a between-subjects factor (because different sentences were used for each item 
type). The ANOVA revealed a main effect of item type [F(1,22) = 61.50, p < 0.001], indicating 
that duration increased for the longer (e.g., THREEs) compared to the shorter (e.g., ONEs) 
sentences, but there was no main effect of talker [F(1,22) = 2.09, p = 0.163] nor an interaction 
between item type and talker [F(1,22) = 0.36, p = 0.557]. This analysis confirms that speaking 
rate was equivalent between the two talkers for the encoding sentences. Recall that both listener 
groups heard the same female talker (F1) during recognition. To confirm that speaking rate was 
equivalent between encoding and recognition for F1’s sentences, an additional ANOVA was 
performed to examine sentence duration for the item types presented for both the encoding and 
recognition phases (i.e., THREEs, TWOs, and ONEs).  There was a significant effect of item 
type [F(2,38) = 55.27, p < 0.001], but no main effect of phase [F(1,38) = 2.28, p = 0.140] nor an 
interaction between item type and phase [F(2,38) = 2.53, p = 0.093]. Finally, all selected 
sentences for the two talkers were equated for root mean square amplitude. These procedures 
ensured that sentence duration and amplitude were equivalent across speakers and phases, and 




Procedure. Following a hearing screening, each listener was tested individually in a 
sound-attenuated booth. The listener was seated at a table that contained a computer monitor, a 
response box, and a keyboard. Auditory stimuli were presented over headphones at a 
comfortable listening level that was held constant across participants. Experiment presentation 
and data collection were controlled with the SuperLab software (version 4.5) on a Mac OS X 
system. The experimenter delivered the instructions verbally. Directions were read from a 
prepared script to ensure that all participants heard exactly the same instructions.  
All responses were collected via a response box and keyboard. Participants were 
instructed to always respond to every trial and encouraged to make their best guess if they were 
unsure of how to respond. Each participant completed an encoding phase followed by a 
recognition phase. The encoding phase consisted of 24 trials, representing one randomization of 
the 24 encoding sentences (6 sentences X 4 idea sets); only THREEs, TWOS and ONEs were 
presented during encoding (see Table 2 and Appendix A). During the encoding phase, 
participants were told that they would listen to sentences, identify colors, and answer questions. 
Each trial during encoding consisted of the presentation of an auditory sentence, a color 
identification task, and a comprehension question. First, the sentence was presented. After 
listening to each sentence, participants then completed the color identification task. The purpose 
of the intervening color identification task was to require participants to hold each sentence in 
memory for a short time. Color identification took about 5 seconds. Four colored squares 
appeared on the screen, one at a time. Participants identified each color as it appeared by 
pressing color-coded buttons on the response box. After identifying the colored squares, a 
question (in text) appeared on the screen regarding the sentence at the beginning of the trial (e.g., 
“What was running from the barking dog?”). Participants answered the question by typing their 
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response into the keyboard. The next trial began following a 3000 ms delay, timed from the 
completion of the keyboard response. The list of comprehension questions for each encoding 
sentence is shown in Appendix B.  
Following the encoding phase, all listeners participated in a recognition phase where they 
heard two repetitions of 30 sentences in a randomized order. All sentences were produced by 
talker F1, and none of the recognition sentences had been presented during encoding. During 
recognition, six sentences from each of the four ideas sets were presented. These included two 
ONES, two TWOS, one THREE, and one FOUR from each idea set; in addition, the six 
NONCASE sentences were also presented (Table 2, Appendix A). On each recognition trial, 
participants heard a sentence and were asked to indicate (1) whether or not they heard the 
sentence during the encoding phase by pressing one of the buttons labeled “Yes” and “No” on 
the response box, and (2) how confident they were in their choice, which they indicated by rating 
their confidence on a 7-point Likert scale (1 being “not confident at all” and 7 being “very 
confident”) using the response box. The entire procedure, including the hearing screen and 
completion of informed consent and demographic forms lasted approximately 45 minutes.  
Results 
 Performance for the encoding and recognition phases was analyzed separately. The 
encoding phase was analyzed in order to determine proportion correct for the color identification 
task and for the comprehension questions. This was done in order to confirm that participants 
were completing the task as directed. For the color identification task, a trial was deemed correct 
if the participant pressed the correct button for all four colored squares. For the comprehension 
questions, a trial was deemed correct if the participant’s response contained the key noun of the 
correct answer. For example, for the question, “What was running from the barking dog?,” an 
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answer was deemed correct if the participant responded “cat,” “the cat,” or “the scared cat” 
because all three responses contain the target noun “cat.” Participants were not penalized for 
obvious typos (e.g., “caat” for “cat”) or spelling errors (e.g., “gurl” for “girl”). Performance on 
the color identification task was near ceiling for both the F1.Semantic (mean = 0.97, SD = 0.05) 
and M1.Semantic groups (mean = 0.90, SD = 0.04). Performance on the comprehension 
questions was also near ceiling for both the F1.Semantic group (mean = 0.89, SD = 0.02) and the 
M1.Semantic group (mean = 0.88, SD = 0.02). This level of accuracy for the color identification 
task and the comprehension questions indicates that participants were completing the task as 
directed. 
 For the recognition phase, the dependent variables were false memories and confidence 
ratings. A trial was considered to be a false memory if a participant pressed the “Yes” button to 
indicate hearing that sentence during the encoding phase. The participant’s response on each trial 
was coded as 1 (false memory, “Yes” response) or 0 (no false memory, “No” response). For 
confidence ratings, the score on the Likert scale (1 – 7, with 7 indicating highest confidence) was 
used as the dependent variable. We first calculated mean proportion false memories and 
confidence ratings for each subject separately for each item type, and then calculated means for 
each item type by collapsing over participants in each condition. Mean proportion false 
memories was very low for the NONCASE sentences for both the F1.Semantic (mean = 0.04, SE 
= 0.14) and M1.Semantic (mean = 0.02, SE = 0.01) groups. Participants were also very confident 
in their memories, with mean ratings near the highest end of the confidence scale for both the 
F1.Semantic group (mean = 6.5, SE = 0.01) and M1.Semantic group (mean = 6.6, SE = 0.01). 
This pattern confirms that listeners showed good memory overall because they correctly 
indicated not hearing these sentences during the encoding phase. This pattern also confirms that 
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performance at recognition is not solely based on sentence length; as the NONCASE sentences 
were of the longest sentence duration but showed very few false memories. 
 Figure 2 shows the mean proportion false memories and mean confidence ratings for the 
item types of interest to our research questions for each of the encoding groups. (Here and 
throughout we display mean performance of the confidence ratings, but because this measure 
does not provide a test of our hypotheses, we do not perform any formal statistical analysis of the 
confidence ratings). Both encoding groups show robust evidence of semantic integration because 
false memories are highest for the FOURs, sentences that matched the complete semantic idea, 
with false memories monotonically decreasing for item types that contain fewer elements of the 
complete semantic idea. The pattern of false memories appears equivalent between the 
F1.Semantic and M1. Lexical groups, suggesting that the presentation of a novel speaker at 
recognition (M1.Semantic) did not influence the degree of semantic integration compared to 
when speaker was held constant across encoding and recognition (F1.Semantic). 
Figure 2. Mean proportion false memories (left) and confidence ratings (right) for each item 





 To examine these patterns statistically, we conducted a generalized linear mixed effects 
model (GLMM) for trial-level responses (0 = no false memory, 1 = false memory) that included 
fixed effects of encoding group, item type, and their interaction. Encoding group was contrast-
coded (F1.Semantic = -1, M1.Semantic = 1). Item type was entered as three orthogonal contrasts: 
(1) FOURs vs. THREEs (FOUR = -1, THREE = 1, TWO = 0, ONE = 0), (2) THREEs vs. TWOs 
(FOUR = 0, THREE = -1, TWO = 1, ONE = 0), and (3) TWOs vs. ONEs (FOUR = 0, THREE = 
0, TWO = -1, ONE = 1). The model also included random intercepts for subject and random 
slopes for item type by subject. The results of the model are shown in Table 3. Proportion false 
memories monotonically decreased from the FOURs to the ONEs, but there was no main effect 
of encoding condition, nor did condition interact with item type for any of the item type 
contrasts. 
Table 3. Results of the GLMM of false memories for experiment 1. 
Fixed effect ?̂? SE z p 
(Intercept) 1.51 0.21 6.95 < 0.001 
Item type: FOUR vs. THREE -1.78 0.36 -4.89 < 0.001 
Item type: THREE vs. TWO -1.97 0.31 -6.29 < 0.001 
Item Type: TWO vs. ONE -1.73 0.20 -8.60 < 0.001 
Condition: F1.Semantic vs. M1.Semantic 0.08 0.19 0.40 0.686 
Condition x FOUR vs. THREE 0.32 0.25 1.24 0.211 
Condition x THREE vs. TWO 0.44 0.25 1.74 0.081 
Condition x TWO vs. ONE 0.18 0.18 1.03 0.301 
 
These results successfully replicated Bransford and Franks (1971) to show that listeners 
integrated semantic information for spoken language, leading to high rates of false memories for 
sentences that are consistent with the complete semantic ideas heard during encoding. The high 
rates of false memories for the FOUR sentences cannot be attributed to their length, because 
false memories of the NONCASE sentences, which were of equivalent length, were very low. 
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Hearing a novel talker at recognition did not show any influence on false memories, suggesting 
that when talker is held constant during encoding, semantic integration is robust, even when 
people are tested on that with a novel talker’s voice. The remaining experiments examine 
whether attention during encoding and the number of talkers during encoding influence semantic 
integration. For experiments 2 – 4, performance in the new encoding conditions will be 
compared against the F1.Semantic group in experiment 1. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Results from experiment 1 provided evidence of integration during encoding because 
listeners showed more false memories at recognition for full idea sentences (i.e., FOURs) 
compared to constituent sentences (i.e., THREEs, TWOs, ONEs), and minimal false memories 
for NONCASEs. Moreover, the results provided no evidence that semantic integration was 
disrupted when a novel talker was encountered during recognition. In experiment 1, attention 
during encoding was always directed towards semantic information. In order to determine 
whether the explicit focus of attention influences semantic integration, as suggested by Luthra et 
al. (2018) for word-length stimuli, experiment 2 followed similar procedures to the previous 
experiment except that listeners were directed to attend to talker information during encoding. 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty adults were recruited from the University of Connecticut 
community to serve as listeners in the experiment; none had participated in experiment 1. 
Participants were native monolingual speakers of English between 18 and 25 years of age (mean 
= 20, SD = 2) with no history of speech, language, or hearing impairment according to self-
report. Ten listeners were women and ten listeners were men. As in the previous experiment, all 
listeners passed a pure-tone hearing screen bilaterally and received course credit or monetary 
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compensation for their participation in the experiment. An additional 16 participants were tested 
but excluded because they did not meet the accuracy criterion for NONCASE sentences (≥ 
80%). We discuss the greater number of excluded participants in experiment 2 compared to 
experiment 1 after we present the results of experiment 2. The new 20 listeners were all assigned 
to the F1.Talker encoding condition; their performance was compared to the F1.Semantic 
condition of experiment 1. 
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of same 54 sentences (produced by talker F1) that were 
used in experiment 1 for the F1.Semantic group. Twenty-four sentences were presented during 
acquisition, with the other 30 sentences presented during recognition. 
Procedure.  The procedure was identical to that described for experiment 1 with one key 
exception; listeners in experiment 2 (the F1.Talker condition) were told to pay attention to talker 
information during encoding instead of semantic information. We implemented this 
manipulation by replacing the comprehension question on each encoding trial with a question 
regarding the talker’s voice. The questions related to talker characteristics were not specific to 
the semantic content of the auditory sentence on each trial. Example sentences include “Does the 
talker sound tired?,” “Have you heard this talker before?,” and “Is the talker male?” The full set 
of talker-related questions are provided in Appendix B. As in experiment 1, the trial structure 
during encoding consisted of hearing a sentence, performing the color identification task, and 
then answering the question. The procedure for the recognition phase was identical to that used 
in experiment 1. 
Results 
Performance was analyzed separately for the encoding and recognition phases. Accuracy 
for the color identification task was analyzed as described for experiment 1. Listeners in the 
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F1.Talker group showed ceiling performance (mean = 0.94, SD = 0.05) for the color 
identification task. With respect to the talker-related questions, most of the questions had no 
clear right answer and thus proportion correct could not be calculated for the talker-related 
questions as was done for the comprehension questions in experiment 1. However, participants’ 
responses to four of the talker-related questions that did have a clear correct answer (e.g., “Is the 
talker male?,” “Is the talker female?”) were examined, which showed ceiling performance for all 
20 listeners in the F1.Talker condition. High performance on the color identification task and 
these four talker-related questions confirms that listeners completed the task as directed. 
 
Performance during the recognition phase was analyzed as outlined for experiment 1. 
Listeners in the F1.Talker condition showed very low proportion false memories for the 
NONCASE items (mean = 0.06, SE = 0.02) and were also very confident in their decisions 
(mean = 6.00, SE = 0.02), which demonstrates that overall memory performance was very good 
in that participants could correctly indicate that they did not hear these sentences during the 
 
Figure 3. Mean proportion false memories (left) and confidence ratings (right) for each item 
type for the F1.Talker encoding group of experiment 2 and the comparison group 




encoding phase. Figure 3 shows mean proportion false memories and mean confidence ratings 
for the FOURs, THREEs, TWOs, and ONEs for the F1.Talker group and the F1.Semantic group 
(from experiment 1). 
Visual inspection of the figure suggests that attending to talker information during 
encoding impeded semantic integration because fewer false memories are observed for the 
F1.Talker group compared to the F1.Semantic group, especially for the item types where the 
semantic integration effect is expected to be the strongest (i.e., the FOURs). To examine this 
pattern statistically, trial-level responses (0 = no false memory, 1 = false memory) were 
submitted to a GLMM following the structure outlined for experiment 1. The results of this 
model are shown in Table 4. The results showed that proportion false memories monotonically 
decreased across the four sentence types, as was observed in experiment 1. 
Table 4. Results of the GLMM of false memories for experiment 2. 
Fixed effect ?̂? SE z p 
(Intercept) 0.91 0.14 6.33 < 0.001 
Item type: FOUR vs. THREE -1.11 0.22 -4.91 < 0.001 
Item type: THREE vs. TWO -1.42 0.23 -6.10 < 0.001 
Item Type: TWO vs. ONE -1.29 0.14 -8.71 < 0.001 
Condition: F1.Semantic vs. F1.Talker -0.46 0.14 -3.27 0.001 
Condition x FOUR vs. THREE 0.75 0.21 3.59 < 0.001 
Condition x THREE vs. TWO 0.80 0.22 3.55 < 0.001 
Condition x TWO vs. ONE 0.49 0.13 3.43 < 0.001 
 
The model also showed a main effect of condition, with more false memories in the F1.Semantic 
compared to the F1.Talker condition, and an interaction between condition and item type for all 
three item type contrasts. To examine the interaction between condition and item type, the simple 
effect of condition was examined for each item type. These analyses showed that proportion 
false memories were higher for the F1.Semantic compared to the F1.Talker condition for the 
 
 23 
FOURs (?̂? = -1.22, SE = 0.27, z = -4.43, p < 0.001) and the THREEs (?̂? = -0.51, SE = 0.21, z = -
2.47, p = 0.013), with equivalent false memories between the two conditions for the TWOs (?̂? = 
-0.15, SE = 0.17, z = -0.91, p = 0.367) and the ONEs (?̂? = 0.04, SE = 0.17, z = 0.22, p = 0.825). 
Though the confidence ratings do not directly bear on our hypotheses, we note that lower 
confidence ratings were reported by listeners in the F1.Talker compared to the F1.Semantic 
group, suggesting that listeners who attended to talker information were less confident in their 
memories compared to listeners who attended to semantic information during encoding. 
 The results of experiment 2 suggest that explicit attention to talker characteristics does 
influence semantic integration. Specifically, those who attended to talker information showed 
fewer false memories at recognition for the FOURs and THREEs compared to those who 
attended to semantic information, suggesting that instead of integrating semantic information 
during encoding, listeners who attended to talker characteristics were better “tuned in” to the 
specific sentences that they heard instead of the integrated semantic ideas. This pattern of results 
differs from the talker attention effect observed in Luthra et al. (2018), who found that attention 
to talker facilitated false memories of semantically-related words, whereas attention to talker in 
the current experiment decreased false memories for semantically-integrated sentences. We 
consider this difference further in the discussion. 
Compared to listeners in the F1.Semantic condition, listeners in the F1.Talker condition 
showed equivalent false memories for the TWOs, ONEs, and – critically – the NONCASEs, 
suggesting that memory performance overall did not differ from those in the F1.Semantic 
condition. However, recall that 16 participants were excluded because they did not meet the 
accuracy criterion for the NONCASE sentences in experiment 2, whereas only two participants 
were excluded for the same reason in experiment 1. Though we can confirm that overall memory 
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(as measured by performance on the NONCASE sentences) was equivalent between listeners in 
the F1.Talker and F1.Semantic conditions (due to our performance criterion), the greater number 
of excluded participants in experiment 2 suggests that attending to talker information may in 
general inhibit memory for the meaning of a talker’s message. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Results from experiments 1 and 2 suggest that (1) attention influences semantic 
integration such that false memories for coherent semantic ideas decreased when listeners 
attended to talker information and that (2) when attending to semantic information, the talker 
match between encoding and recognition did not influence semantic integration. In order to 
further assess the influence of talker variability on semantic integration, we manipulated the 
number of talkers heard during encoding in experiment 3. Listeners still heard F1 during the 
recognition phase, but now heard two talkers (F1 and M1) during encoding with attention 
directed towards semantic information. Performance for this condition (F1-M1.Semantic) was 
compared to the F1.Semantic condition of experiment 1. If talker provides a critical context for 
semantic integration, then we should observe fewer false memories at recognition when listeners 
hear two talkers during encoding compared to when they hear only one talker during encoding. 
Methods  
Participants. Twenty adults who did not participate in previous experiments were 
recruited from the University of Connecticut community to serve as listeners in the experiment; 
all were assigned to the F1-M1.Semantic condition. Participants were native monolingual 
speakers of English between 18 and 22 years of age (mean = 20, SD = 1) with no history of 
speech, language, or hearing impairment according to self-report. Sixteen listeners were women 
and four listeners were men. As in previous experiments, all listeners passed a pure-tone hearing 
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screen bilaterally and received course credit or monetary compensation for their participation in 
the experiment. Two additional participants were tested but excluded from analyses due to low 
accuracy on the NONCASE sentences. 
Stimuli. The stimuli sentences were the same sentences as described for experiment 1; 
however, during encoding half of the 24 sentences were said by F1 and the other half were said 
by M1. Sentences were split sentence type across idea sets so that each talker said the same 
number of sentences for each item type and each idea set during the encoding phase. The 
recognition sentences were those used for the recognition phase in experiments 1 and 2, all 
produced by talker F1. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that described for experiment 1. All listeners 
attended to semantic information during encoding.  
Results 
Performance was analyzed as outlined for experiment 1. Mean proportion correct during 
encoding was near ceiling for both the color identification task (mean = 0.96, SE = 0.04) and the 
comprehension questions (mean = 0.88, SE = 0.05). Mean proportion false memories for 
NONCASE sentences during recognition was very low (mean = 0.01, SE = 0.01), and mean 
confidence ratings for the NONCASE sentences was very high (mean = 6.43, SE = 0.16). 
Figure 4 shows mean proportion false memories and mean confidence ratings for the 
FOURs, THREEs, TWOs, and ONEs for the F1-M1.Semantic group (tested in experiment 3) and 
the F1.Semantic comparison group from experiment 1. Visual inspection suggests that for the 
FOURs and the THREEs, there are numerically fewer false memories for those who heard two 
talkers during encoding compared to those who heard only one talker, with the opposite pattern 
observed for the ONEs. The numerical differences between conditions, however are quite small. 
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To examine this pattern statistically, trial-level responses (0 = no false memory, 1 = false 
memory) were submitted to a GLMM with the same structure as outlined previously. The results 
of this model are shown in Table 5.  
 We again observed a main effect of item type, with false memories monotonically 
decreasing from the FOURs to the ONEs. There was no main effect of condition (F1-
M1.Semantic vs. F1.Semantic), but there was a significant interaction between item type and 
condition for the THREE vs. TWO contrast and the TWO vs. ONE contrast. In both cases, the 
direction of the interaction suggests a more monotonic relationship among item types for the 
F1.Semantic compared to the F1-M1.Semantic groups. To explicate the interaction, the simple 
effect of condition was examined at each item type, which did not show evidence of a difference 
between the two conditions at any of the item types (p ≥ 0.199 in all cases). Thus, though we 
observe a significant interaction between item type and condition in the omnibus model, the 
follow-up comparisons do not converge to provide strong evidence that performance at 
Figure 4. Mean proportion false memories (left) and confidence ratings (right) for each item 
type for the F1-M1.Semantic encoding group of experiment 3 and the comparison group 




recognition differs between the two encoding conditions. Collectively, the results of experiment 
3 provide little evidence indicating that hearing two talkers during encoding impairs semantic 
integration. In experiment 4 we provide an additional test by examining whether a greater degree 
of talker variability during encoding (24 talkers) would pattern as was observed for the minimal 
talker variability (2 talkers) in experiment 3. 
Table 5. Results of the GLMM of false memories for experiment 3. 
Fixed effect ?̂? SE z p 
(Intercept) 1.31 0.18 7.20 < 0.001 
Item type: FOUR vs. THREE -1.60 0.29 -5.37 < 0.001 
Item type: THREE vs. TWO -1.80 0.26 -6.81 < 0.001 
Item Type: TWO vs. ONE -1.49 0.16 -9.33 < 0.001 
Condition: F1.Semantic vs. F1-M1.Semantic -0.07 0.16 -0.42 0.673 
Condition x FOUR vs. THREE 0.31 0.21 1.45 0.146 
Condition x THREE vs. TWO 0.45 0.22 2.06 0.039 
Condition x TWO vs. ONE 0.33 0.14 2.23 0.025 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
The results of experiment 3 provide little evidence to suggest that talker provides a 
context over which listeners integrate semantic information. However, in experiment 3, listeners 
only heard two talkers during encoding, and one of those talkers was also heard during 
recognition. In order to provide a stricter examination of the possible extent that talker variability 
may influence semantic integration, experiment 4 presents the speech of 24 different talkers 
during encoding. 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty adults who did not participate in previous experiments were 
recruited from the University of Connecticut community to serve as listeners in the experiment. 
All were assigned to the Fx-Mx.Semantic condition. Participants were native monolingual 
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speakers of English between 18 and 22 years of age (mean = 17, SD = 1) with no history of 
speech, language, or hearing impairment according to self-report. Sixteen listeners were women 
and three listeners were men; one listener did not report gender. As in previous experiments, all 
listeners passed a pure-tone hearing screen bilaterally and received course credit or monetary 
compensation for their participation in the experiment. 
Stimuli. Stimuli consisted of the same 54 sentences as previous experiments. Sentences 
during recognition were again spoken by F1. However, unlike experiments 1-3, during encoding 
each sentence was spoken by a different talker (i.e., listeners heard 24 different talkers). Twenty-
four new talkers (F2-F13 and M2-M13) were recorded producing four repetitions of sentences 
from one of the four idea sets in a randomized order (i.e., four repetitions of six sentences). All 
talkers were monolingual native speakers of American English. Recordings were made and 
selected using the same procedures described in Experiment 1, including implementing the 
procedures for equating sentence duration and root-mean-square amplitude.  
Procedure.  All participants were assigned to the Fx-Mx.Semantic condition, and their 
performance was compared to the F1.Semantic condition of experiment 1. The procedure was 
identical to that outlined for experiment 1.  
Results 
Performance during the encoding phase was near ceiling for both the color identification 
task (mean = 0.91, SE = 0.22) and the comprehension questions (mean = 0.90, SE = 0.03). As for 
all other experiments and conditions, mean proportion false memories for the NONCASE 
sentences at recognition was very low (mean = 0.04, SE = 0.02), and participants were very 
confident of their responses for the NONCASE sentences (mean = 6.45, SE = 0.01). Figure 5 
shows mean proportion false memories (and confidence ratings) at recognition for the FOURs, 
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THREEs, TWOs, and ONEs. Inspection of the figure suggests that there are fewer false 
memories for those who heard 24 different talkers during recognition compared to those who 
heard only one talker for the FOUR sentences, with little difference between the two encoding 
groups for the other item types. 
Table 6 shows the results of the GLMM for trial-level responses (0 = no false memory, 1 = false 
memory), which had the same model structure as outlined previously. The model confirmed a 
monotonic relationship between proportion false memories and item type, with false memories 
decreasing from the FOURs to the ONEs. There was no main effect of condition; however, there 
was a significant interaction between condition and item type for all three item type contrasts. 
Analysis of the simple effect of condition at each item type showed fewer false memories when 
24 talkers were heard during encoding compared to when only one talker was heard during 
encoding for the FOURs (?̂? = -0.54, SE = 0.21, z = -2.44, p = 0.014), but no other simple effect 
at any of the other item types was statistically reliable (p ≥ 0.193 in all cases). 
Figure 5. Mean proportion false memories (left) and confidence ratings (right) for each item 
type for the Fx-Mx.Semantic encoding group of experiment 4 and the comparison group 




Table 6. Results of the GLMM of false memories for experiment 4. 
Fixed effect ?̂? SE z p 
(Intercept) 1.23 0.13 9.10 < 0.001 
Item type: FOUR vs. THREE -1.11 0.20 -5.53 < 0.001 
Item type: THREE vs. TWO -1.49 0.20 -7.34 < 0.001 
Item Type: TWO vs. ONE -1.43 0.13 -10.31 < 0.001 
Condition: F1.Semantic vs. Fx-Mx.Semantic -0.03 0.13 -0.29 0.765 
Condition x FOUR vs. THREE 0.49 0.18 2.64 0.008 
Condition x THREE vs. TWO 0.49 0.19 2.56 0.010 
Condition x TWO vs. ONE 0.26 0.13 1.96 0.049 
 
The results of experiment 4 suggest that semantic integration is decreased when there is 
extensive talker variability during encoding. This effect, however, was relatively small in 
magnitude, with the Fx-Mx.Semantic encoding group showing evidence in support of semantic 
integration overall, given the high proportion of false memories for sentences consistent with the 
complete semantic idea presented during encoding.      
DISCUSSION 
Previous research has demonstrated that we tend to store the meaning of messages and 
not the exact wording and grammatical structure (e.g., Bartlett, 1995; Brewer & Wells, 2006; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Dudai, 2012; Simons & Chabris, 2011). For instance, 
researchers have shown that listeners spontaneously integrate semantically related information 
into complete ideas (Bransford & Franks, 1971). Research has also found evidence of talker-
specificity effects, which is when information about a specific talker is preserved in listeners’ 
memory (Goldinger, 1998). However, these talker-specificity effects are most strongly observed 
when attention is directed to talker identity compared to when attention is directed to syntactic 
information (Theodore et al., 2015). Thus, talker information is important at the word level 
during the early stages of spoken language processing, but meaning is important in the later 
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stages of remembering sentences. The current study examined whether talker information and 
attention provide context over which semantic integration occurs at the sentence level.   
In experiment 1, the F1.Semantic condition was a replication of Bransford and Franks 
(1971), of which results from all other conditions were compared. In this condition, listeners 
heard a single talker during encoding and recognition and showed more false memories at 
recognition for complete idea sets (i.e., FOURs) compared to their constituents (i.e., THREEs, 
TWOs, and ONEs). These results are consistent with Bransford and Franks (1971). In 
experiments 1, 3, and 4, talker variability during encoding was manipulated. Results from these 
manipulations suggest that talker has a limited role in the process of memory integration because 
talker variability only influenced semantic integration when 24 talkers were presented during 
encoding, as talker variability had the greatest effect on the longer linguistic units (i.e., FOURs) 
in experiment 4. However, even then, evidence of semantic integration was still observed.   
In addition to talker variability, the current study suggests that attention does play a role 
in semantic integration. In experiment 2, false memories for longer linguistic units (i.e., THREEs 
and FOURs) were reduced when listeners attended to the speaker compared to semantic 
information. However, there was still high evidence of semantic integration as false memories 
for TWOs, THREEs and FOURs remained above 60% even when listeners attended to talker 
information. The role of attention on semantic processing is broadly consistent with Luthra et al. 
(2018) as talker effects for longer items types were greatest when attention was explicitly 
directed to talker in the current study. In Luthra et al. (2018), false recognition of words 
semantically related to previously studied items was influenced by speaker congruency across 
encoding and recognition phases, but only when listeners actively encoded talker information. 
Therefore, indexical information (i.e., speaker-specific qualities of speech signals) pervades 
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semantic integration processes to a limited extent unless there is explicit attention to talker. It is 
possible that our memory, by default, does not retain a great deal of talker information when 
processing semantically-related linguistic information. But, when listeners are directed to attend 
to talker variation, indexical information is more strongly integrated into recognition memory. 
This appears to occur at the word and the sentence levels.  
Notably, in Luthra et al. (2018), attending to talker information increased false memories 
of semantically-related words, whereas the current study showed that attending to talker 
information decreased false memories of semantically-integrated sentences. One reason for this 
divergence in results could be that the comparisons made across talker and attention conditions 
in each study were different. The current study compared two same talker conditions 
(F1.Semantic and F1. Talker), thus the only difference between conditions in experiment 2 was 
attention. On the other hand, Luthra et al. (2018) compared a same talker to a different talker 
group, and both groups were attending to talker information; therefore, the only difference 
between the groups was talker variability. The study did not compare two same talker groups 
where the only manipulation was attention, limiting the degree to which results from both studies 
can be compared. The current study and Luthra et al. (2018) both found an influence of attention 
on semantic integration, but in order to fully understand whether false memories increase or 
decrease based on talker variability and attention, future experiments and analyses need to be 
done.    
Despite some differences in false memories based on talker variability and attention, the 
overall pattern of the data demonstrates that talker provides a limited influence on semantic 
integration. If there was an influence, there would be significant differences in false memories 
when talker variability during encoding was introduced, and this effect would be greater for 
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longer sentences. However, the data demonstrated that talker variability only significantly 
influenced FOURs when 24 talkers were heard during encoding, and this effect was relatively 
small in magnitude. In all encoding groups where attention was directed to semantic information, 
there was evidence in support of semantic integration overall. Explicit attention to talker 
information is needed to have the greatest effects, but even then, listeners are not necessarily 
better at integration. In all conditions, false memories for TWOs, THREEs and FOURs remained 
above 50%, showing that neither talker information nor attention prevented listeners from falsely 
recognizing semantically-related sentences. 
While there was no strong effect of talker on false memories, a robust effect with 
confidence of memories was observed. Confidence ratings decreased for longer item types when 
multiple talkers were heard during the encoding phase. Furthermore, attention provided the 
greatest effect on confidence ratings, such that confidence ratings were lower for longer item 
types when attending to talker compared to other experimental conditions. In contrast to the 
limited role of talker and attention on accuracy of memory, there were systematic influences of 
talker variability and attention on confidence ratings. Therefore, while semantic integration is an 
automatic, unconscious process that occurs under variable conditions, certain conditions reduce 
the strength of memories and our conscious judgement of them. Maybe talker and attentional 
information is retained in memory to some degree to influence our conscious perception of 
memories, however, this information does not hinder the process of integration itself.  
The results of the current study are consistent with previous literature on the 
abstractionist approach and how speech is organized by listeners based on abstract properties as 
oppose to specific speaker information (e.g., Fitzpatrick & Wheeldon, 2000; Lahiri & Reetz, 
2002; Nguyen, Wauquier, & Tuller, 2009; Norris, & McQueen, 2008; Stevens, 2002). The fact 
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that listeners reported false memories and thus integrated semantic information despite talker 
variability and attention manipulations suggests that the brain abstracts information, even during 
the later stages of spoken language processing (e.g., when listeners integrate complete idea sets). 
When processing spoken sentences, speaker variation is removed prior to mapping speech input 
to abstract categories. The number of talkers or what an individual is attending to has a limited 
effect on the accuracy of memory. At the same time, the current study also suggests some 
evidence of episodic (exemplar) theories which stem from our ability to retain surface details of 
spoken words (e.g., Goldinger, 1998; Palmeri et al., 1993; Van Berkum et al., 2008). When 
talker variability during encoding was maximized in experiment 4 and when listeners were 
attending to talker information in experiment 2, listeners demonstrated less false memories for 
longer linguistic units. Talker-specific information was stored in memory, influencing 
integration. In experiment 4, listening to the same talker increased false memories compared to 
listening to multiple talkers. In experiment 2, attending to semantic information increased false 
memories compared to attending to talker information. For longer linguistic units, listening to 
different talkers or attending to talker information made rejection of new sentences and retrieval 
of episodic memories easier. In these contexts, memory was more like a tape recorder and 
consistent with episodic memory. However, there is a limit to episodic memory as there was still 
strong evidence of semantic integration overall. The results of the current study suggest some 
evidence of episodic representation of spoken language, but overall the data set trends towards 
abstractionist representations for semantic integration.  
We hypothesized that listening to the same talker would increase false memories, and 
sentences spoken by different talkers would be stored as separate episodic memories. However, 
results from the current study point to abstractionist theories to explain sentence recognition and 
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memory. This is a remarkable process that can be beneficial in many ways. For instance, if our 
memory integrates complex patterns of information into more meaningful representations with 
limited interference from talker and attentional influences, then spoken language processing can 
effectively occur under variable conditions. Listeners can learn relationships between pieces of 
information when exposed to many different talkers. However, this process of semantic 
integration is not beneficial when our memory needs to recall exact, accurate information (e.g., 
eye witness reports). Memory for complex events are reconstructed as related pieces of 
information are introduced, influencing the formation and retrieval of stored representations. Our 
memories are not videos of our experiences. They are transformed and revised by cognitive 
processes. These processes are so robust that talker variability or attention to who and what was 
said have little influence.  
The current study contributes to basic science and our understanding how language for 
memory works. However, lines for future research can examine different contexts where talker 
information might be more informative in semantic integration. For instance, studies with 
clinical populations where semantic integration is impaired (e.g., cognitive-communication 
deficits) or adverse listening conditions (e.g., non-native listening, noise, etc.) would further our 
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This table lists stimuli used during encoding and recognition. Sentences were created from four 
idea sets and consisted of five sentence types: FOUR, THREE, TWO, ONE, and NONCASE. 
 
Idea set Type Sentence Phase 
E FOUR The scared cat running from the barking dog jumped on the 
table. 
Recognition 
 THREE The cat running from the barking dog jumped on the table. Encoding 
 THREE The scared cat was running from the barking dog. Encoding 
 THREE The scared cat running from the dog jumped on the table. Recognition 
 TWO The scared cat jumped on the table. Encoding 
 TWO The cat running from the dog jumped on the table. Encoding 
 TWO The scared cat was running from the dog. Recognition 
 TWO The cat was running from the barking dog. Recognition 
 ONE The cat jumped on the table. Encoding 
 ONE The dog was barking. Encoding 
 ONE The cat was scared. Recognition 
 ONE The cat was running from the dog. Recognition 
F FOUR The old car pulling the trailer climbed the steep hill. Recognition 
 THREE The car pulling the trailer climbed the steep hill. Encoding 
 THREE The old car climbed the steep hill. Encoding 
 THREE The old car pulling the trailer climbed the hill. Recognition 
 TWO The old car climbed the hill. Encoding 
 TWO The car pulling the trailer climbed the hill. Encoding 
 TWO The old car pulled the trailer. Recognition 
 TWO The car climbed the steep hill. Recognition 
 ONE The hill was steep. Encoding 
 ONE The car pulled the trailer. Encoding 
 ONE The car was old. Recognition 
 ONE The car climbed the hill. Recognition 
G FOUR The tall tree in the front yard shaded the man who was smoking 
his pipe. 
Recognition 
 THREE The tall tree in the front yard shaded the man. Encoding 
 THREE The tree in the front yard shaded the man who was smoking his 
pipe. 
Encoding 
 THREE The tall tree shaded the man who was smoking his pipe. Recognition 
 TWO The tall tree was in the front yard. Encoding 
 TWO The tree shaded the man who was smoking his pipe. Encoding 
 TWO The tall tree shaded the man. Recognition 
 TWO The tree in the front yard shaded the man. Recognition 
 ONE The man was smoking his pipe. Encoding 
 ONE The tree was tall. Encoding 
 ONE The tree shaded the man. Recognition 
 ONE The tree was in the front yard. Recognition 
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Idea set Type Sentence Phase 
H FOUR The girl who lives next door broke the large window on the 
porch. 
Recognition 
 THREE The girl who lives next door broke the window on the porch. Encoding 
 THREE The girl who lives next door broke the large window. Encoding 
 THREE The girl broke the large window on the porch. Recognition 
 TWO The large window was on the porch. Encoding 
 TWO The girl broke the window on the porch. Encoding 
 TWO The girl broke the large window. Recognition 
 TWO The girl who lives next door broke the window. Recognition 
 ONE The girl lives next door. Encoding 
 ONE The window was large. Encoding 
 ONE The window was on the porch. Recognition 
 ONE The girl broke the window. Recognition 
n/a NONCASE The man who lives next door broke the large window on the 
porch. 
Recognition 
n/a NONCASE The girl who was running from the barking dog climbed the 
steep hill. 
Recognition 
n/a NONCASE The scared cat which broke the window on the porch climbed 
the tree. 
Recognition 
n/a NONCASE The old man who was smoking his pipe climbed the hill. Recognition 
n/a NONCASE The barking dog jumped on the old car in the front yard. Recognition 
























This table lists the comprehension and talker-oriented questions presented for each sentence 
during the encoding phase. The comprehension questions were presented for the semantic 
attention conditions whereas the talker-oriented questions were presented for the talker attention 
condition. As described in the main text, item order was randomized across participants during 
the encoding phase.  
 
Item Sentence Comprehension question Talker-oriented question 
1 The scared cat was running 
from the barking dog. 
What was scared? Was the talker male? 
2 The scared cat jumped on 
the table. 
What was scared? Did the talker change from 
the previous sentence? 
3 The dog was barking. What was barking? Have you heard this talker 
before? 
4 The car pulling the trailer 
climbed the steep hill. 
What pulled the trailer? Does the talker sound old? 
5 The old car climbed the hill. What was old Does the talker have a low-
pitched voice? 
6 The hill was steep. What was steep? Does the talker have a loud 
voice? 
7 The car pulled the trailer. What pulled the trailer? Does the talker's voice 
sound breathy? 
8 The tree in the front yard 
shaded the man who was 
smoking his pipe. 
Who was smoking his pipe? Was the talker female? 
9 The man was smoking his 
pipe. 
Who was smoking his pipe? Does the talker's voice 
sound clear? 
10 The girl who lives next door 
broke the large window. 
Who lives next door? Does the talker's voice 
sound pleasant? 
11 The large window was on 
the porch. 
What was on the porch? Does the talker's voice 
sound rough/hoarse? 
12 The girl broke the window 
on the porch. 
Who broke the window? Does the talker's voice 
sound weak? 
13 The window was large. What was large? Have you noticed a change 
in the talker's voice? 
14 The cat running from the 
barking dog jumped on the 
table. 
What was running from the 
barking dog? 
Does the talker have a 
foreign accent? 
15 The tall tree was in the front 
yard. 
What was tall? Does the talker sound tired? 
16 The girl who lives next door 
broke the window on the 
porch. 
Who lives next door? Does the talker sound 
young? 
17 The cat running from the 
dog jumped on the table. 
What was running from the 
dog? 




Item Sentence Comprehension question Talker-oriented question 
18 The cat jumped on the table. What jumped on the table? Does the talker sound 
confident? 
19 The old car climbed the 
steep hill. 
What was old? Does the talker have a high 
pitched voice? 
20 The car pulling the trailer 
climbed the hill. 
What was pulling the trailer? Does the talker sound 
unclear? 
21 The tall tree in the front yard 
shaded the man. 
What was tall? Does the talker sound 
intelligent? 
22 The tree shaded the man 
who was smoking his pipe. 
What shaded the man? Does the talker sound 
hesitant? 
23 The tree was tall. What was tall Does the talker sound 
friendly? 
24 The girl lives next door. Who lives next door? Does the talker sound 
happy? 
 
